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ABSTRACT
After the first democratic, multiparty elections held in 1990, the process of
building state institutions commenced within the framework of newly-sov-
ereign Croatia. This article describes the development of the national
security system: the history of the Croatian Intelligence Service and the
Intelligence Community, and their origin, structure, tasks and activities.
The first five years (1993-1998) of the national security system of the
Republic of Croatia are presented in detail and evaluated. HIS was
formed in 1993 as the central agency of the National Security Office
(UNS). The main objectives were the liberation of Croatia's occupied terri-
tories and dealing with the regional crisis. HIS also cooperated with for-
eign intelligence agencies on intelligence assessments of the regional cri-
sis and support of the international troops (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR,
SFOR, etc). The author stresses the legal and ethical criteria upon which
HIS and the Croatian intelligence community were established.
Introductory remarks
There are many reasons to record the history of the Croatian
Intelligence Service and Intelligence Community of the Republic of
Croatia. This is the first such record and I believe that the theme
will be a subject of research in the future. Satisfying the curiosity
of the public regarding the activities of the intelligence service in
order to dispel preconceptions and fears and rebut constant
attacks in the media is one reason and contributing to the under-
standing, monitoring and support of the security apparatus is
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another. My motives for this presentation is a little different but
also less ambitious.
First, pointing out the spiritual and moral basis upon which the
Intelligence Community apparatus of the Republic of Croatia was
formulated or, second, commenting upon the amount or accura-
cy of intelligence products the intelligence communities provide to
their governments does not in itself lead to the resolutions which
governments recommend or the international community and key
international factors impose. As a matter of fact, the Republic of
Croatia was deeply involved in the resolution of the crises on the
territory of Southeastern Europe since 1990; therefore, the
Croatian Intelligence Community was a subject of and partner in
the collection and exchange of not only data and intelligence, but
intelligence assessments on the crises in the region as well as sug-
gesting possible means for resolving the bloodiest European crises
in the second half of the twentieth century. I am therefore con-
vinced that the lack of intelligence was not responsible for the
long and bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Intelligence can
often influence the form and direction of political, social and his-
torical events, but not always. I am still surprised today that
ambassadors of various countries still display a large degree of
misunderstanding as to the reasons and causes for the dissolution
not only of the multi-national states (late 1980s to early 1990s)
USSR and Czechoslovakia, but also the former Yugoslavia.
Considering their position and responsibilities, this lack of under-
standing is a very disturbing indicator.
The intelligence services devote much of their efforts address-
ing the needs of diplomatic and international political relations.
Since the services are only responsible for the collection of data
(and their analysis) but not for political policies, those who are
acquainted with the facts should be horrified that the knowledge
and intelligence data regarding actual events, individuals, and
processes are being neglected, denied, or rejected due to reign-
ing stereotypes and superficial media reports.
The first five years of the Croatian Intelligence Service coin-
cided with the inception and formation of the (new) institutions of
the Croatian state, the War of the Homeland, the liberation of
occupied territories, and with intensive engagement in interna-
tional relations (Washington and Dayton agreements), the pres-
ence of international forces (UN, NATO) in the Republic of
Croatia (1992-1998), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and,
ultimately, in Kosovo. During these five years, members of the
Croatian Intelligence Community participated in large numbers in
operations which undoubtedly contributed to all the major military
and historical changes; therefore, their participation in these
changes testifies to the successes of the intelligence community. In

























international recognition, liberation of its territory and integration
into the most important international organizations. The success-
es of the Republic of Croatia are obvious even if based only on
the changes in the political map of Europe between 1990-1998.
Nonetheless, in the nature of intelligence work there are no
significant changes. This review, as every personal record, has an
additional selfish motive: to provide an understanding of the
nature of intelligence and the results of intelligence activities. My
academic interest has always been centered around the organi-
zation and exchange of knowledge. Intelligence reports are cer-
tainly one form of knowledge which requires acquaintance with,
and prediction of, future events; that is, such reports serve as a
basis for reaching decisions of national interest.
It is not my intention here to enter into a theoretical discussion
of intelligence. But I must admit that I have often been reminded
during these years of Francis Bacon’s divisions of prejudice (false
conceptions), which he calls idols and which he divides into tribal
idols, idols of the cave, idols of the marketplace, and idols of the
theatre1. I have often witnessed how the intelligence service (and
the entire intelligence community) has been subject to prejudices
of the media as well as politicians - sometimes with justification
(because of a lack of transparency) - but for the most part without
justification (when there is a desire to reject its findings), since it is
easier for politicians and the media to hide behind stereotypical
ways of thinking (prejudice) than to be exposed to risk. The
destruction of some stereotypes, such as: Yugoslavia is a wonder-
ful country and a perfect example of multinational communities -
can be very bloody, and can lead to negative repercussions for the
protagonists and founders of newly formed states in the eyes of
those who for whatever reason do not wish to change their idols.
Knowledge and intelligence can enable an understanding of the
former and current state of affairs; intelligence announces change
and possible new developments. The prejudices are often a result
of the unwillingness to change one’s views, or to reconcile one’s
views with actual processes. Politicians often provide proof that it
is not necessary to change one’s views and positions, at least not
as long as their mandate is in force. In this case, intelligence
reports are ineffective; they serve only to irritate. Therefore, reali-
ty attempts to form itself around idols proposed in advance.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of such an experiment: the
massive efforts of the international community introduce into
Bosnia and Herzegovina (along with good intentions and good
will) a resolution reached in essence by means of knowledge but
without intelligence. Instead of allowing the three nations within
Bosnia and Herzegovina to independently reach a resolution and
agreement on their own future after peace is re-established, the

































its lack of understanding and recognition of the facts, and thus is
the cause of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crises and tragedy.
The history of the Croatian Intelligence Service is a part of the
story of the struggle of the Croatian nation for independence,
freedom and autonomy, a story of the creation of the Republic of
Croatia and state institutions. HIS, in its all-encompassing efforts
toward freedom and independence, was comprised of people -
for the most part those who participated in the War of the
Homeland - who were not professional soldiers, but volunteers,
patriots, and fighters who were given two new tasks. First, to pro-
vide the political leadership (in cooperation with other members
of intelligence community) with relevent intelligence for the liber-
ation of occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia and the
resolution of the regional crises provoked by the dissolution of the
former Yugoslavia; second, in cooperation with their intelligence
services, to acquaint the leading countries, that is, the interna-
tional community, with the actual situation in Croatia and the
entire region. In order to perform this task it was necessary to form
the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) and the intelligence com-
munity.
I EPILOGUE: NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICE AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
In October 1998, the work of the Intelligence Academy of the
National Security Office began. I appeared before the first grad-
uates of the Intelligence Academy in a new role: as lecturer, and
not any longer as director of the Croatian intelligence Service2;
new tasks required of me an account of all that transpired during
the first five years of the existence of HIS and the Intelligence
Community. The model of the Intelligence Community was simple
to present: every action, every resolution had its justification and
reason based upon the conditions in which it was created. A sum-
mary of this model is provided on the following pages3. The dry
presentation of the facts eliminates, however, the intensiveness of
the activities, most often during conditions of war, under which the
intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia was created.
National Security Office
The National Security Office was formed by decree of the
Croatian President on March 21, 1993. The creation and devel-
opment of the National Security Office and the Intelligence
Community commenced with this act. The model for the Croatian
Intelligence Community was based upon the experiences of the


























ty, and the core of the system is comprised of two civil and two mil-
itary services.
The National Security Office (UNS) is a supreme state body
which brings into conformity, directs, and oversees the work of the
bodies of state administration whose activities are connected to
national security activities. The National Security Office, as
appears in Article 2 on the Law on the National Security Office
4
:
coordinates the work of state ministries with the activities of
national security;
directs and oversees the work of the intelligence and counter-
intelligence services;
dissects, connects and analyzes intelligence data and reports
necessary for the performance of the constitutional duties
of the President of the Republic of Croatia and the
Government of the Republic of Croatia;
provides counter-intelligence protection and security for the
President of the Republic, Croatian State Parliament, the
Government of the Republic of Croatia and the buildings
they utilize.
In order to perform the duties of the National Security Office
as prescribed by law, the following services were founded:
Croatian Intelligence Service
Security Headquarters
Control and Supervision Service
In order to perform the professional and technical activities of
the National Security Office, the following services were formed:
Croatian National Sigint Service 
Intelligence Academy
The Office is administered by a director
5
appointed and
relieved of duties by the President of the Republic. The President of
the Republic appoints - at the recommentation of the Director of
the Office - the various directors of the individual services of the
National Security Office. The Director of the National Security
Office answers to the President of the Republic for the work of the
National Security Office and the individual services of the
National Security Office.
The Joint National Security Committee (SONS) was
formed to direct and coordinate the work of the state ministries
with the National Security Office on tasks relating to national
security. The director of the National Security Office presides over
meetings of SONS and the members of SONS are the deputy
director of the National Security Office, the director of HIS and
ministers of the state ministries.
The National Security Office prepares regular reports to the
President of the Republic and the Government of Croatia on


































over the legality of the work of the National Security Office is
performed by the House of Representatives of the Croatian
National Parliament through the Committee on Domestic Policy
and National Security. The National Security Office provides a
yearly report on its work to this Committee and, at the request
of the Committee, special reports on individual issues of nation-
al security. 
The Croatian Intelligence Servcice is the central service
for the National Security Office and the only external intelli-
gence service of the Republic of Croatia which:
collects intelligence data of national interest outside
Croatia;
dissects, combines, analyzes, and makes available intelli-
gence data and reports to the President of the Republic,
the director of the National Security Office, Prime
Minister of the Government as well as state and other
ministries within the government of the Republic of
Croatia;
works with foreign intelligence services;
directs and organizes the work of the intelligence services
of the Republic of Croatia.
In addition to the aforementioned duties, the Croatian
Intelligence Service performs other tasks in conformity with the
law and other regulations.
The director administers the work of the Croatian
Intelligence Service and is responsible for its work and per-
forming tasks received from the President of the Republic, the
director of the National Security Office and the Joint National
Security Committee.
The director of the Croatian Intelligence Service calls and
presides over the meetings of the Coordinating Committee of
the Intelligence Community, organizes the work of the intelli-
gence and security services, and presents and represents the
Intelligence Community and the Croatian Intelligence Service in
meetings with representatives of foreign intelligence services.
The Control and Supervision Service monitors the con-
stitutionality and legality of the work of the intelligence services.
It also follows, collects, and analyzes data on the work of the
members of the intelligence services of the Republic of Croatia,
as well as services and various sections of the National Security
Office. Monitoring is effected through direct contact, investiga-
tion or as the result of a requested special supervision.
After the facts of a situation have been confirmed, the
Control and Supervision Service delivers a report to the direc-
tor of the National Security Office and the appropriate minister,


























progress in the work of the individual services and the Intelligence
Community in its entirety. 
The Control and Supervision Service is administered by the
director and composed of permanent members named by repre-
sentatives of the various intelligence agencies of the Republic of
Croatia.
The UNS Security Headquarters is not really a service, but
a body which coordinates, supervises, and directs the work of the
agencies that perform security tasks and protect individuals and
edifices. 
The Headquarters recommends goals, strategies, and protec-
tion plans for the highest state officials of the Republic of Croatia,
presidents of foreign states, government, parliament, delegations
and individuals whose visit to Croatia is of great significance. 
It is also in charge of security and protection of the President
of the Republic, Croatian National Parliament, Government of the
Republic of Croatia and other protected persons, as well as
objects they utilize.
The director of the UNS Security Headquarters presides over
the Supreme Security Committee, whose members are: director of
the Headquarters, deputy director of the Headquarters, assistant
to the director of the Croatian Intelligence Service for counter-
intelligence activities, the appropriate assistant to the Minister of
Internal Affairs, the appropriate assistant to the Minister of
Defense, the head adjutant of the President of the Republic, the
commander of the First Honor Guard, and the director of state
protocol.
The Croatian National Sigint Service (NSEI) is an expert
agency of the National Security Office, which is functionally con-
nected to the Central Sigint Services of the Directorate of
Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian Army Headquarters (GS
OS RH).
The NSEI coordinates, directs, and oversees electronic moni-
toring of all kinds of signals outside the borders of the Republic of
Croatia as well as diversionary-terrorist communications and pro-
hibited signals of an intelligence nature within the borders of the
Republic of Croatia.
The NSEI director is responsible for the work of the service
and performance of tasks received by the directors of UNS and
SONS.
The Intelligence Academy is an educational and research
institute of the National Security Office which provides training
and education of the cadres in order to meet the needs of the
Croatian Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Academy
organizes basic and specialized schooling for members of the



































The Croatian Intelligence Community is comprised of agen-
cies who by special means and methods collect both within and
without the country data of interest to national security. Goals and
tasks of the Intelligence Community are determined by the Joint
National Security Committee (SONS) and Intelligence Community
Coordination Committee (KOOZ). 
The Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia is
responsible for obtaining data of significance for:
national security, and especially for conducting foreign and
defense policies and ensuring economic well-being in
accordance with laws and regulations;
opposing terrorism and organized crime;
protection of the highest state officials, diplomatic representa-
tives in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian representatives
outside Croatia, as well as objects of state and national
interest.
The Intelligence Community is responsible for providing
assessments and intelligence to the President of the Republic of
Croatia, the Prime Minister of the government, and ministers of
state ministries in order to enable them to more effectively protect
national security, that is, promote national interests.
The Joint National Security Committee (SONS). 
The task of SONS is to direct and organize the work of the
state ministries in performing actions relating to national interests.
SONS sets goals, and tasks and approves work plans of the intel-
ligence community, and also determines policies and strategies
relating to protection of the domestic and foreign officials. SONS
also prescribes measures and activities relating to protection of
national interests.
The director of the National Security Office presides over the
sessions of SONS, and members of SONS are comprised of the
deputy director of the National Security Office, the director of the
Croatian Intelligence Service and ministers of state ministries. The
national security and domestic policy advisers to the President of
the Republic of Croatia also participate in the work of the Joint
National Security Committee.
Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence Community. 
The coordinating committee of the Intelligence Community
(KOOZ) is responsible for the implementation of tasks received
from SONS. KOOZ coordinates the work of all agencies in the
implementation of their appointed tasks.
The director of HIS presides over the sessions of KOOZ,
whose members consist of the deputy director of HIS, the assistant
minister of domestic policy (director of the Service for the54
Protection of the Constitutional Order), the assistant minister of
defense for security, the head of the Security Intelligence Service,
the head of the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within the
Croatian Army Headquarters and the head of the Department of
International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense. The
director of HIS can when necessary invite representatives of NSEI,
the Intelligence Academy, financial police, administrators of the
Croatian customs, criminal police and military police to sessions
of KOOZ.
Per the Handbook on the Work of the Croatian Intelligence
Community, the Coordinating Committee, among other things:
prepares yearly plans and work programs of the Intelligence
Community;
approves and accepts joint operative actions;
organizes the work of the members of the Intelligence
Community;
performs analyses and evaluations of the more important
operative actions;
brings methods of the agencies’ activities into conformity with
regulations;
monitors the state of affairs in the various services and under-
takes steps to make improvements; 
suggests systems of training, procurement and preparation of
members of the Intelligence Community in an opera-
tional-technical sense;
resolves conflicting interpretations in cases where jurisdiction
of activities in various services overlap or are unclear, and
other cases where conflicts exist.
Members of the Intelligence Community 
The core of the Intelligence Community is comprised of four
agencies which perform intelligence work:
Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS)
Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia
(SZUP);
Security Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense of the
Republic of Croatia (SIS); 
Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian Army
Headquarters (ObU GSOSRH).
The Department of International Military Cooperation of the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia is a member of the
Intelligence Community, but it is not an intelligence agency in the
true sense of the word, as it collects data through diplomatic con-




































Croatian Intelligence Service 
HIS is the main and supreme service of the National Security
Office (UNS). HIS implements the goals and tasks received from
UNS. As the central agency of the intelligence community, HIS
brings into conformity and directs the work of the intelligence and
security services in activities of interest for national security and
leads or monitors the joint operations of the Intelligence
Community. HIS collects, analyzes, and evaluates data which is
obtained outside Croatia by direct operational work; within the
territory of the Republic of Croatia, it is allowed to operate only in
collaboration with other intelligence services.
HIS is authorized to work with foreign intelligence services.
HIS brings together, analyzes, and evaluates data it has
obtained through direct operational activities or from other mem-
bers of the intelligence community. The analytical work product is
provided by HIS to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the
Prime Minister of the Government of Croatia, and other appro-
priate parties.
Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP) 
SZUP, in conformity with regulations on the Law on domestic
activities6, performs tasks relating to the protection of the constitu-
tional order, especially counter-intelligence tasks within the entire
territory of the Republic of Croatia. SZUP prevents actions and
intentions which violently endanger or destroy the constitutional
order of the country. SZUP is also involved in issues of terrorism
and organized crime within the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
Security Intelligence Service (SIS) 
In conformity with the Law on defense7, SIS collects informa-
tion involving counter-intelligence protection of the armed forces
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia. SIS has no
authority over civilian citizens of the Republic of Croatia except in
cases of wartime operations when by order of the Minister of
Defense the activities can be expanded to civilians in areas of mil-
itary activity. SIS also performs counter-intelligence and security
protection of military production regardless of the status of partic-
ipants.
The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (GS OS RH) 
The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs collects intelligence
data for use by the Croatian Army. The Directorate is not permit-
ted, in the performance of these tasks, to create an agent network
or implement operations outside the Republic of Croatia, except
in times of war. Outside Croatia it may only exchange intelligence
data through official channels with military bodies with whom the
Republic of Croatia cooperates.
Department of Internatonal Military Cooperation 
This service is responsible for procuring data which is
obtained through official channels by military envoys of the
Republic of Croatia outside Croatia from institutes by which they
are accredited. Such reports are presented to the Minister of
Defense and the Croatian Intelligence Service. This service may
not act operationally either outside or within the Republic of
Croatia.
Area of Activity of the Intelligence Community
The President of the Republic of Croatia provides direction for
the work of UNS and the Intelligence Community of the Republic
of Croatia. The director of UNS and state ministers determine the
tasks of the services for which they are responsible. Every service
prepares its yearly work plan according to the directions and tasks
they have received. The yearly work plan of the Intelligence
Community is prepared by KOOZ and consists of projects and
operative actions in which two or more services must participate.
The Joint National Security Commettee approves the yearly work
plan of the Intelligence Community and monitors its implementa-
tion.
Between 1993-1998, the tasks of the Intelligence Community
included the following areas of national interest:
protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Croatia (liberation of the occupied territories
of the Republic of Croatia);
problems of regional security (resolution of the crises in
Bosnia-Herzegovina);
international terrorism and organized crime;
counter-intelligence protection.
From the beginning, the focus of the intelligence work of the
Intelligence Community was the territorial integrity of the Republic
of Croatia and regional stability, and two thirds of the operations
and projects, i.e., the capacity of the services, was devoted to
these goals. Only one third of the capacity was directed toward
international terrorism, organized crime and counter-intelligence
protection8. 
Form of reports 
HIS’s information was utilized for the most part by the
President of the Republic, Prime Minister of the government and
ministers of certain ministries. All reports sent to the above are
sent also to the head of the National Security Office.
HIS sends to its users the following type of information: ana-
lytical articles (basic type of analytic work product), analytical
studies (long-term character), and daily intelligence (selection of
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current information of short-term character). As needed, HIS also
sends its users certain information from other members of the
Intelligence Community.
Cooperation with foreign services 
Cooperation with foreign services is determined in the yearly
plan, on the basis of agreements on cooperation with partner
services. As the service which is authorized to work with foreign
partners, HIS implements the majority of the cooperation pro-
grams with foreign partners. Other members of the Intelligence
Community of the Republic of Croatia may work with related for-
eign services, but only with the knowledge and permission of HIS,
that is, the Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence
Community.
Cooperation with foreign services develops on the basis of
exchange of information, technical, educational and, finally, joint
operations as the epitome of cooperation between two partner
services. HIS’s basic area of cooperation with foreign services
consists of problems of regional stability, international terrorism
and organized crime.
Monitoring UNS and the Croatian Intelligence Community 
Monitoring of the work of UNS is performed by the President
of the Republic. Monitoring the legality of the work of UNS is the
responsiblity of the House of Representatives of the Croatian
National Parliament through its Committee on Internal Affairs and
National Security. UNS provides the Committee with yearly reports
on its work and also, at the request of the Committee, special
reports on individual activities within its jurisdiction.
Regular and special monitoring of the services of the
Intelligence Community is performed by the UNS Control and
Supervision Service.
Difficulties with the Model
One of the primary reasons for the formation of UNS and the
Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia was the politi-
cal necessity of coordinated and consistent reporting to the polit-
ical leadership; until 1993, it was the case that the primary users
were receiving conflicting reports on the same issues or even sim-
ilar evaluations, but during different time periods, which provoked
confusion.
Several years of intensive effort were needed to create trust
between the services, services which by their very nature are dis-
trustful. After some years, the Intelligence Community was func-
tioning in conditions of full trust between the most senior individ-
uals but also on lower levels. There were two critical reasons for
such a development of events: first, there was too much work, too58
few people and too little equipment for just one service to perform
the work alone; and second, in conditions of war in the country
and the critical regional situation, no single service wished to
assume the risk and responsiblity for eventual failures or miscal-
culations. The destruction and death were too great, and only by
joint efforts could the danger be removed. The service chiefs and
operatives realized and accepted this after several joint operations
and successful actions such as Epilogue, or joint operations of
security of international troops in the Republic of Croatia and in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, operations in which literally all of the intelli-
gence and security services of the Republic of Croatia participat-
ed.
Problems and misunderstandings occurred not in the
Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia, but in the
media representations of the Intelligence Community during the
pre-election campaign rhetoric in 1997 and 1999. It was alleged
that in the Republic of Croatia, there were nine or even eleven
intelligence agencies9, and that there was complete confusion in
relations between VONS, SONS and KOOZ10. 
I am convinced that the prescribed model established balance
between the politicians which determined tasks, and the goals,
and the Intelligence Community, which implemented those tasks
professionally and autonomously according to the law and rules
of the trade11. In order for the Intelligence Community to have
really been able to function as a group of synchronized agencies,
it was necessary for all its integral parts to be able to operate suc-
cessfully as individual units and to coordinate work relating to
national security.
The most important coordinating body is the Joint National
Security Committee (SONS), presided over by the director of UNS.
Members meet as deemed necessary12 to analyze the security sit-
uation and to determine priorities of action for the Intellligence
Community in the protection of national interests.
The Intelligence Community Coordination Committee
(KOOZ) is comprised of all major figures of all intelligence and,
as needed, security services in the Republic of Croatia. KOOZ
transforms the strategic dimension, as defined by SONS, into
operational tasks. KOOZ is also concerned with the precise divi-
sion of work between the four intelligence services which exist in
the Republic of Croatia: two civilian (SZUP and HIS), and two mil-
itary (VOS and SIS)13. 
The President of the Republic, director of UNS, and state min-
isters determined the goals but were not involved in operations.
The director of HIS and heads of the services (who were, in
essence, assistant ministers) were involved in operations but not in
setting goals for the service. In this manner, politicization of the

































based upon eventual political interests was made impossible.
Because of the two-tiered system of responsibility (subordination
and coordination - service chiefs were primarily responsible to
their minister, but also to the director of HIS14 for joint operations),
the system was transparent for all participants, as there was no
possibility of arbitrariness either in the selection of tasks or their
implementation. Nor was it possible to abandon responsibilities
which had been assigned. A series of legal acts and regulations
determined the relations between the members of the Intelligence
Community, that is, between UNS and HIS. Legal regulations
which determine intelligence activities grow from year to year, and
with this, pressure on operatives to strictly follow prescribed pro-
cedures. Parallel to this, the efficiency of the intelligence services
has also grown and created a “surplus” of information which has
been difficult to disseminate to a wide circle of users because,
unfortunately, other potential users (in the government and
Parliament) were not (and still are not today) sufficiently responsi-
ble concerning the sensitivity and protection of the classified doc-
uments and data.
II PROLOGUE: AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS
In the fall of 1993 in Washington I met for the first time with
CIA Director James Woolsey. Although HIS had just been consti-
tuted, meetings with foreign agencies were intensive from the very
beginning, as everyone was seeking firsthand contacts and infor-
mation. The American system, magnitude, potential and needs
were impressive. This created an even larger imbalance between
foreign agencies and HIS, which consisted of a small number of
enthusiasts and amateurs. We did not hide the fact that we were
brand new in the field, amateurs who wished to learn the trade. It
was because of this imbalance that I was surprised by the words
with which Woolsey greeted me: “I hear that you’ve discovered the
best kept secret in Washington – that we have no policy towards
the former Yugoslavia.” During a later visit, when I told the NSA
director that the intelligence for a regional stability solution is not
to be sought in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in Washington, which in
the meantime had assumed the leading role in the region, I
received the following answer: “If something is a secret, we can
discover it, but not if it’s a mystery.”
Soon we established very good relations with most intelli-
gence agencies. I believe we achieved this due to our honesty,
directness and dedication. In our relations with foreign agencies,
we never falsified facts or idealized the reality (at least not inten-
tionally). We took foreign operational officers and analysts on site,
to the frontlines and into the battlefields, enabling them to get an
insight into the actual situation and allowing them to reach their60
own conclusions. Our naivete spoke against us, but our open-
ness, collected intelligence and results were to our advantage15.
On several occasions I heard the same reaction from representa-
tives of different foreign agencies. They were saying for the first
time that they were dealing with real people, people who com-
municate directly and who actually do what they promise.
The relationship with foreign agencies was a two-way street of
mutual recognition and establishment of trust. We established
good relations with all those who wished to learn about the actu-
al state of affairs in Croatia, as well as in the region. In the early
nineties, not all countries or their governments were familiar with
the causes of the crises or the actual state of affairs in the former
Yugoslavia. After several years of intensive cooperation, with all of
the world agencies operating in this relatively small area, lack of
intelligence could not be a reason or excuse for the fact that the
crises in Southeast Europe was still continuing. Croatia emerged
from the crises owing to its own political and diplomatic efforts
and military operations. However, one hundred thousand soldiers,
members of international forces, are still deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, and it is not cer-
tain that their mission will end in the near future.
How and why did HIS (i.e. the Croatian Intelligence
Community together with HIS) in such a short time become an
equal interlocutor and later on, an equal partner, to agencies with
a very long history? Why are there no crucial differences in the
assessment of the situation in the region? Why are existing differ-
ences being exaggerated at the diplomatic table?
Let us repeat once again: HIS was formed in 1993 as a cen-
tral agency of the National Security Office (UNS). The UNS was
not a legal successor of any institution16. This means that HIS did
not inherit or take over anyone else’s personnel or archives. The
employment policy was not to hire people who had worked for the
former agencies of the communist system. What was common to
most people who started working at HIS was their participation in
the Homeland War17. As this was only one of the criteria in the very
strict recruitment selection, the chief asset of HIS was, from the
very beginning, young, capable and modest people, who initially
did not have any intelligence experience, but were aware of the -
on site circumstances and possessed the ability to assess and eval-
uate both people and events.
What we were all familiar with, regardless of our participation
in the Homeland War, were the relations within former Yugoslavia,
the main causes and actors in the crises, as well as the views of
the formal and informal leaders and their standing on the politi-
cal scene. All this was beyond the understanding of the foreign-
ers, as their point of departure was a thesis and an image in which

































former Yugoslavia was “a very nice country.” All those who lived
in it, but were not part of the communist establishment, knew how
far that picture departed from the reality.
Where then lay the advantage of the amateurs over the pro-
fessionals? Did the advantage really exist or are we only imagin-
ing it?
I believe that the advantage did exist and that it was due to
the fact that we were part of the reality, that we were familiar with
the reality and knew what values we advocated and fought for. For
us there were no multiple solutions – solutions, theory and logic
could devise and the illogical ones diplomacy proposed of. We
knew exactly what the other sides in the conflict wanted. We
wished the events to take only one direction in order to make a
break from the past: the unitarian Yugoslav state and its commu-
nist regime. We knew the past very well and also knew what we
did not want. We probably idealized our goals, but not the past.
Because of that, our road to the future was very clear, although
not easy.
Our advantage lay in the belief that each intelligence assess-
ment depended on a correct diagnosis of the situation. The theo-
ry that the prognosis is conditioned by the diagnosis can be
explained by the following model18.
The essential thesis is a simple one:
Peace and stability in the region - i.e. some new, desirable reality
- cannot be achieved by means, goals and models which
depart from real diagnosis of the crises. In other words, the
means, goals and models shall only be realized to the extent
that the initial premises (i.e. the set of information upon which
the diagnosis of the present condition is based) actually coin-
cide with the factual state of the crises.
Viewed from the methodological standpoint this attitude is
plausible. If we are to accept the thesis just presented, then we
must be prepared to face the consequences thereof:
The goals and means for the resolution of a problem necessarily
derive from the description of that problem (facts and infor-
mation by which a problem is described are the basic argu-
ment for the achievement of the desired objective); 
There is no substantial difference between diagnosis and progno-
sis: the estimate of an existing condition and that of a desired
condition are united by a common system of values which
must be consistent, so that - as a result - both the evaluation
of the crises and the model for the crises resolution are even-
tually consistent;
We only see what we want to see. We accept only information
which we can understand. We understand only that which
corresponds to our system of values; we propagate only those

























other words, the multitude of information and the ever-
increasing quantity of data (relating to the crises) do not have
a cumulative impact. New quants of information do not
increase our knowledge; rather, they increase the discrepan-
cies between the opposing sides. The parties involved, having
different points of view and departing from different systems of
values, inevitably attribute a different meaning to the same set
of information and data. Whenever there is a contradiction of
interests among the various parties involved, their communi-
cation - in the course of time - progressively becomes ever
more divergent and eventually results in an ever lower level of
understanding.
I am deeply convinced that these postulates are valid for all
participants in the crises: for those advocating global and local
solutions, for the developed and underdeveloped, great and
small, powerful and weak, civilized and those who are not. These
are simply the postulates of the organization and the exchange of
knowledge which govern the behavior of social groups and polit-
ical communities.
III CONTROVERSIES, REALITIES AND PREJUDICE
....... controversies
What was the reality and what were the objects of interest and
activities of such a large number of intelligence agencies? What
were the points of discussion and cooperation between HIS and
the Croatian Intelligence Community on the one side, and foreign
intelligence agencies on the other?
Although it may seem superfluous, it is necessary to outline
the basic contours of the events that were taking place in former
Yugoslavia. These events still remain the cause of the unresolved
crises in the Southeast of Europe19.
A year and a half after the first freely held multi-party elections
in 1990, Yugoslavia disintegrated. The process of decay was
accelerated at the moment when all of the contradictions were
exposed and the reality of Yugoslavia had become an illusion and
a deception. The newly created countries celebrated their inde-
pendence and emancipation, and the world pragmatically accept-
ed the new realities as a fact, though - more often than not - it
never actually understood the real reasons and causes of the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia was a country laden with contradictions20. These
contradictions are critical for the understanding of the past, the
present, and the future of the relations between the nations and
countries now created in the area of the former Yugoslavia. These
contradictions are the determinig factors of the fears and desires,
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as well as the motivations and objectives, of the newly created
subjects on the historical and political scene.
The co-existence of that time in the former Yugoslav state was
equally cruel, as was the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation
itself. Those who do not understand that, or do not take that into
account, can never understand the situation in former Yugoslavia
and will hardly be able to articulate paths and ways for finding a
solution for the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) and Kosovo
today, and perhaps in the near future in Macedonia.
An obvious example of unresolved contradictions is the crises
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the old contradictions should be added
the new ones, provoked by the war and imposed by present/past
solutions for multi-ethnic states.
The American idea of a nation advocates a multi-ethnic state,
in harmony with the American experience, i.e. a nation as a sin-
gle state having several ethnic communities. The European expe-
rience, however, is different. Europe is aware of and familiar with
a state as a multi-national country and this view is also present in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH): none of the three nations in BH is will-
ing to give up its nationality.
The diverging American and European ideas of a nation
come from two different historical experiences, two different inter-
pretations of reality and, finally, two different visions of the future.
The European models for the resolution of the Bosnian crises fol-
lowed the European experiences - mostly Swiss and Belgian21.
...... Realities and Prejudices
A number of democratic changes took place in Croatia in
early 1990:
A multiparty political system was legalized and free elections
were held;
The newly constituted Parliament met on May 30;
And in December of the same year, a new Croatian constitu-
tion, and constitutional laws regarding human rights and
liberties and the rights of ethnic and national communi-
ties and minorities within the Republic of Croatia, came
into being.
Aware that this process of democratization would call into
question his plans for a Greater Serbia, Miloševiæ offered his sup-
port to the extremist wing of the Serbian minority within Croatia,
who were threatening armed revolts and terrorizing those around
them who held a different opinion. This was occurring with the
logistical, political, and propaganda support of both Serbia and
the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). Military preparations for the
realization of the project of Greater Serbia started in 1985 with
the restructuring of military districts in former Yugoslavia in such a
way that they covered the area of Greater Serbia22.64
On May 19, 1991, a referendum was held in Croatia. Ninety
four percent of voters voted for Croatian independence. Based on
the results of the referendum, the Croatian Parliament adopted a
constitutional declaration on the sovereignty and independence of
Croatia on May 25, 1991. 
The War in Croatia and the Reaction of the International Community
In July of 1991, after attempting a military intervention in
Slovenia, the JNA carried out a brutally aggressive attack on
Croatia, occupying about 25 percent of its territory. The JNA was
controlled by the Serbs and, in the latter years of the war, was in
effect reorganized into three different Serbian armies: the
Yugoslav Army (JA), the Serbian Krajina Army and the Republika
Srpska Army. The attack on Croatia, combined with the JNA’s
later activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in cooperation with other
Serbian paramilitary units, provoked an extended security crises in
the region.
The aggression against Croatia carried out by the JNA came
at an unfavorable time with respect to the international communi-
ty, as it occurred immediately after the Persian Gulf War, and in
the shadow of the crises which shook the USSR, and led to its col-
lapse. Today we know that only a military engagement in favor of
the victims of Serbian aggression could have been effective; how-
ever, nobody in the international community really considered this
a serious option. All of the world’s key actors were in support of
preserving Yugoslavia. It is enough to remember the attempts
made to preserve Yugoslavia with Ante Markoviæ, and later with
Milan Paniæ.
The international community’s response regarding the
aggression of the then JNA against Slovenia and Croatia showed
that it was taken by surprise by the ongoing events, and that it
could not activate the necessary security mechanisms to put an
end to the aggression.
After both Croatia and Slovenia postponed their declarations
of independence for three months, upon the insistence of the
European Community, the UN provided the Serbian army an
opening to pacify Croatia in September of 1991 by imposing an
embargo23 on the import of arms upon the entire territory of the
former Yugoslavia. This occurred under conditions of incredible
military odds favoring the Serbian army over the poorly armed
Croatian police and National Guard Corps units.
However, the international political players eventually had to
face the fact that they had been trying to avoid: Yugoslavia, as a65
nation-state, was untenable. The only argument remaining for the
regime in Belgrade was one of brute military force. Croatia, on
the other hand, had free elections, a new and democratic consti-
tution, and a referendum which confirmed its desire for freedom
and independence to support its decision. Croatia expressed its
determination in choosing and protecting its independence at all
costs.
Serbia, however, did utilise its chance to realize its military
goals. It could no longer hide from the international community
the destruction and criminal activity for which it was responsible in
Croatia. Croatia’s military resistance and international public
opinion, appalled by the extent of Serbian aggression at the end
of 1991, led to the first meaningful actions taken by the interna-
tional community: the Badinter Commission24 confirmed the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia as an international entity. Croatia was then
recognized as a sovereign and independent state, first by the
nation-states of Europe, and then by the rest of the international
community. The United Nations, in cooperation with the Vance
Plan, decided to send international forces to Croatia to carry out
the plan25.
What did Croatia obtain with international recognition? On
the one hand, it received political satisfaction, and on the other, it
was able to incorporate the international community’s mecha-
nisms of operation for itself - UNPROFOR, and later UNCRO.
Unfortunately, these mechanisms did not prove very effective. The
political will needed to substantiate the signed agreements was
absent and this resulted in a blockade that lasted from 1991 to
August 1995. Consequently, Croatia may have been recognized
as an independent state26 in 1991/1992, but it was forced to
allow UNPROFOR and UNCRO into Croatia with all of their
restrictions, limitations and prohibitions in the UNPA zones.
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Miloševiæ’s war machine, which was brought to a halt in
Croatia only after it had temporarily occupied one fourth of its ter-
ritory, soon turned its efforts toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its goal
was comparable to that in Croatia, to destroy the country, reshape
the ethnic picture within that territory and create a Greater Serbia.
With respect to both the level of brutality and the magnitude
and intensity of the destruction, this episode of Serbian aggres-
sion, committed against both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
has been the bloodiest in European history since World War II.
Because of these particular details, BH became a serious problem
for the new European and world orders. It combined the interests
of three national groups with divergent political interests: these

























cles, something which has presented a deeply rooted historical
problem in this region. This fact, along with the possibility that the
conflict would spread to the neighboring countries of this region,
prompted the international community to reconsider the political,
military and security mechanisms in its concept of the new world
order which had just begun to take shape.
Minimal consensus existed among the international actors
only on one point: containing the conflict to the given territory and
preventing it from spreading to the rest of the region. The ques-
tions of a political solution and territorial boundaries remained
unanswered because these key international actors had such
divergent interests that an agreement was impossible, an agree-
ment which would eventually lead to the conclusion of the armed
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Diplomatic efforts of the international community were evident
but unsuccessful. A “Cutileiro Plan” was conceptualized prior to
the escalation of the war in BH. However, no attempt was made
to implement this plan. It was followed by the Vance-Owen Plan
in April 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan in September 1993,
and the Contact Group Plan in June 1994. All the proposed plans
were de facto failures as a result of the Serbs’ repeated refusal to
cooperate. With the international community lacking authority
and the UNPROFOR forces lacking efficacy on the ground, a
solution could not be formed. Consequently, this meant that the
war in BH would continue. However, the search for a settlement
opened up a whole new set of developments within Croatia.
In spite of different interpretations, Croatian policy towards
Bosnia was clear and transparent from the very beginning. It rest-
ed on two basic principles, constitutiveness and territoriality for
each of the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Constitutiveness
and equality of all three peoples – Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs –
is of crucial importance for the Croats, who are smallest in num-
ber. Territoriality, regardless of how it is described – provinces,
cantons, union of three republics – is a precondition for a nation’s
continuance, and for the Bosnian Croats, it is a guarantee that
they will not be repeatedly outvoted at the local level. It is because
of this that Bosnian Croats voted for an independent Bosnia-
Herzegovina at the referendum27. The Republic of Croatia was the
first28 to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state
and the only one to sign all the proposed plans for the resolution
of the Bosnian crises, because all of them more or less respected
the principles of constitutiveness and territoriality.
The Liberation of Croatia’s Occupied Territories: Operations Flash, Summer 1995 and
Storm
During the summer of 1995, after a lengthy negotiation

































community, Croatia was finally forced to face the fact that
prospects for a peaceful return of the occupied areas were not
viable in the near future. In order to protect its own national inter-
ests, the Croatian Government decided to liberate the occupied
territories by military means. Due to the geographic nature and
circumstances in which Croatia found itself, the occupied territo-
ries presented a lasting problem for the normal development and
functioning of the country.
The situation in Croatia was made more difficult by circum-
stances in BH, especially by the critical state of affairs in the Bihaæ
region. Bihaæ, a UN “safe haven” in name only, had already
found itself in dire straits a number of times because of continual
siege by Serbian forces, which included rebel units from Croatia’s
Knin area. If Bihaæ had fallen, Croatia would have been faced
with a huge new wave of refugees. To make matters worse, the
necessary conditions would have been set for the Serbian quasi-
states in Croatia and Republika Srpska in neighboring Bosnia-
Herzegovina to unite into one contiguous whole. In May 1995,
the Croatian Army launched the military operation “Flash” and
freed Western Slavonia. In coordination with the Bosnian Croatian
army (HVO) and the Bosniac army (ABIH), and on the basis of an
agreement signed in Split29 outlining future military co-operation
between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation “Summer
1995” was undertaken, freeing up the area bordering the Knin
region on the Bosnian side. Some time later, at the beginning of
August of the same year30, a much more elaborate operation,
“Storm”, took place. This operation liberated most of the remain-
ing temporarily occupied territories in Croatia. The liberation of
these areas created the conditions necessary for the active inclu-
sion of the international community into the process of conflict
resolution in the region. However, after the well known Republika
Srpska army’s occupation of the Srebrenica and epa31 “safe-
havens” took place, the credibility of both the international com-
munity and the UN mission was destroyed. 
After a lengthy but unsuccessful negotiation process, the
actions of the Croatian Army allowed the international communi-
ty to integrate itself actively and effectively into the crises resolu-
tion process in the region. With a great deal of American diplo-
matic engagement, as well as NATO strength, the peace process
was reinvigorated and the necessary results were achieved for
peace and security to be established in the area.
Signed only after a great deal of painful compromise, the
Dayton Peace Agreement32 marked the beginning of the normal-
ization of relations between the republics of the former Yugoslavia,
and an end to the aggression, war, devastating destruction and
human suffering in BH. Even though the peace agreements deal

























tribution was important. This was not only because it had changed
the strategic situation on the ground by the successes of
Operation “Storm”, but because it had thwarted the Serb siege of
Bihac, which had lasted 1000 days. It was also because of the key
role played by the Croatian delegates in Dayton, even rescuing
the peace process on more than one occasion.
*****
All these events and assessments of possible developments
were and still are a topic of discussion between HIS and foreign
intelligence agencies. Differences in Croatian and foreign intelli-
gence assessments of the regional crises are not significant, par-
ticularly before the liberation of occupied territories in Croatia and
the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina33. Assessment
differences became larger only after this period, when foreign
agencies lost interest in domestic political developments of partic-
ular countries and when this interest shifted to non-governmental
and “non-governmental” organizations and the diplomacy.
The differences increased first, in the evaluation and assess-
ment of the interior political situation, due to ignorance about the
history and the past that determined the present circumstances
and second, because of the fundamental difference in the con-
ception of human rights in American and European politics as a
basic instrument for the solution of the crises.
Let us clarify the first thesis. The dream of a multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural Bosnia-Herzegovina is not in conflict with the vision
of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather with experiences of
the past: BH - as a multi-national and multi-cultural community -
had been called, for years, “a small Yugoslavia”. That is why the
“Americanization of the Balkans” is in contradiction with both the
history of BH and the history of (former) Yugoslavia, which makes
the applicability of this concept to its future very questionable. Let
us say once again: there is no contradiction in intentions; it is the
vision which contradicts BH history.
Let us clarify the second thesis. American policy34 was guided
by the human rights principle; however, American policy only
acknowledges individual human rights and treats them as if they
were universal human rights. Individual human rights form the
basic principle upon which rests the American globalization poli-
cy. Unlike the American approach, Europe acknowledges both
individual and collective human rights: the right to culture, reli-
gion, language, nation, etc. The Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo
is essentially about collective, not individual human rights. It is
because of their failure to recognize this difference that the NATO
troops in Kosovo misdirected the goal of their mission, and KFOR


































IV – SAPERE AUDE35
During the first five years of their existence, the Croatian
Intelligence Service (HIS) and the Croatian intelligence communi-
ty contributed significantly to the liberation of occupied Croatian
territories. HIS participated in intelligence assessment processes
and its members personally took part in all military operations
until 1995, not just as operatives and analysts, but also as mem-
bers of military units. This was only possible in a unique period
when patriotism made such solutions possible. That unique peri-
od is now behind us. Only those who have been at war, who have
felt the bitterness of defeat and the glory of victory, can begin to
understand the relations of trust, courage and dedication estab-
lished among people who began a job together and persevered
until they reached their goal.
For a number of years, people were directly exposed to the
dangers of war. It was mere luck that none of the HIS members
were killed in military operations and operations in the battlefield.
It was partially owing to the efforts of the intelligence community
that the last occupied part of Croatian territory – so called East
Sector – was peacefully reintegrated with the rest of the country
from 1995 to 1998.
During the entire time, HIS and the Croatian Intelligence
Community also cooperated with foreign intelligence agencies on
issues of regional stability. They also provided support for the
security of international troops (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR,
SFOR, etc) in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each year all
Croatian intelligence and security services were praised and
thanked for their efforts and assistance by commanders of NATO
and the international forces36.
During its first five years, HIS dedicated two thirds of its actions
and capacities to the tasks of the liberation of occupied territories
and regional stability. About one third of assignments pertained to
the antiterrorist program and organized crime. In war and postwar
circumstances, this part of the program was partly related to the
first group of tasks.
In a short time, HIS established cooperation with a large num-
ber of foreign agencies37. These established partnership relations
were and still are a contribution to the stability of the whole
region. It is owing to these relations that particular countries, their
services and governments, were able to recognize the realities in
Southeast Europe in a better and more precise way, which means
that the services cooperating with HIS had at their disposal intelli-
gence and facts about the reality in the crises area. As has been
said before, there is no prognosis without an accurate diagnosis70
of the situation. However, responsibility for the use of intelligence
rests with the politicians. In spite of the availability of intelligence,
one should not overestimate the power and role of intelligence
agencies on any side, since their findings are just one of the
sources that are ultimately determined by the worldviews, goals
and possibilities of those who make the decisions.
In a speech38 delivered on the occasion of the adoption of the
National Security Office (UNS) Act in May 1995, I indicated a
goal to which we all subscribed and to which we dedicated our
efforts: “To form an intelligence community with UNS as a central
institution and HIS as an elite agency. The goal is to ensure strate-
gic information for long-term strategic decisions by the leadership
(the President of the Republic and the Government). To guide the
activities in such a way that it is publicly known that we are creat-
ing, and that we are, an intelligence elite, both professionally and
ethically. No action, operation or behavior of our members
should be unethical. We desire respect not only from the Croatian
political scene, but also from the international intelligence com-
munity. We must strive to be better than any services in the former
socialist countries, and more efficient than most West European
agencies.
Our objective is to be a small, but highly professional and
ethical agency. Our every member must be above average. The
nature of our work is intellectual; we work using our minds or
engaging others to acquire knowledge of a superior kind.
To be an elite, intelligence elite is to be above any average.
Therefore an easy goal is not our goal. Only that which is high
enough and important enough for strategic decisions and assess-
ments...”
From the very beginning, the Croatian Intelligence Service
was asked to aim for the highest goals: freedom and independ-
ence for Croatia, peace and stability in the region. In return,
members of the Croatian Intelligence Service received the best
that their country had to offer: a chance, opportunity and role in
the historical changes. There are no words that can describe the
feeling of belonging and participating in the struggle for the rights
of the Croatian people and enabling all the citizens of Croatia to
be able to choose and form their own faith and future.
NOTES
1 Today we could present Bacon’s divisions in another way: cultural bias, personal bias,
media bias (prejudice of public opinion), group bias (prejudice based upon inter-
est).
2 I was the director of HIS and the deputy director of UNS from 1993 to May 1998. I
resigned at my own reqeust. I was however appointed president of the Educational
Council of the Intelligence Academy in October, 1998.

































at the Intelligence Academy. Some formulations are taken from the brochure “UNS
and the Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia”, an internal publication
of UNS from January, 2000.
4 Law on the National Security Office (NN 37/95).
5 The following acted as directors of the National Security office between 1993-1998:
· Hrvoje Šariniæ (3.4.1993 - 12.10.1994)
· Krunoslav Olujiæ (12.10.1994 - 18.5.1995)
· Miroslav Tudjman – served as acting director (14.6.1995 - 1.2.1996)
· Luka Bebiæ (1.2.1996 - 15.12.1996)
· Ivan Jarnjak (16.12.1996 - January 2000)
6 Law on Domestic Policy (NN 29/91, 19/92, 33/92, 76/94)
7 Law on Defense (NN74/93)
8 Per the Proposed Work Plan for 2000, the main tasks should include:
· Croatian national interests and regional stability;
· protection of sovereignty and integrity;
· international terrorism and organized crime;
· counter-intelligence protection of classified data in the state government bodies;
· protection of economic interests.
It is obvious from this that during the years, changes have taken place regarding the
main foci of the Intelligence Community, according to political and security devel-
opments.
9 The weekly magazine “Globus” (No. 468) published an article entitled “Nine intelli-
gence and counter-intelligence agencies are active in the Republic of Croatia”, to
which the Secretariat of UNS responded in a statement of December 8, 1999.
10 VONS - Defense and National Security Council, which is appointed per the
Constitution by the President of the Republic of Croatia.
11 The work of the intelligence and security services of the Republic of Croatia is reg-
ulated by a series of laws. The most important are:
· Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (NN 8/98)
· Law on the system of state administration (NN 75/93)
· Law on state officials and deputies and on salaries of legal officials (NN 74/94,
86/94, 7/95)
· Law on the National Security Office (NN 37/95)
· Law on Domestic Policy (NN29/91, 73/91, 19/92, 33/92, 76/94)
· Law on foreign policy (NN 48/96)
· Law on Defense (NN 74/93)
· Law on changes and additions to the Law on Defense (NN 57/96)
· Law on service in the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia (NN 23/95, 33/95)
· Law on financial police (NN 89/92, 16/93)
· Law on changes and additions to the Law on financial police (NN 94/93)
· Law on additions to the Law on financial police (NN 28/94)
· Law on customs agency of the Republic of Croatia (NN 53/91, 57/91)
· Law on changes and additions to the Law on customs agency (NN 106/93)
· Law on protection of classified data (NN 108/96)
· Law on negotiating and implementing international agreements (NN28/96)
· Law on investigatory commissions (NN 24/96)

























13 Or, according to other criteria: two intelligence services (HIS, VOS) and two coun-
terintelligence services (SZUP, SIS).
14 Director of HIS has the status of state minister as he presides over the members of
KOOZ, who are assistant ministers.
15 Since the very beginning we were open for cooperation. In his guidelines, Croatian
President Franjo Tudman always determined the type, direction and scope of coop-
eration. As a rule, we received instructions for openness and directness in the pass-
ing of real goals and intentions of the official Croatian policy.
16 It is not true that the UNS is a legal successor of the Office for the Protection of
Constitutional Order headed by Josip Manoliæ, as was reported in the media.
17 President of the Republic Franjo Tudjman visited HIS on October 10, 1996. On that
occasion I informed the President of the personnel structure in the HIS: 80 percent
of men, i.e. 50 percent of all employees, took part in the Homeland War. HIS
employees do not have military ranks, but there was also one general, two
brigadiers, five colonels, etc., with personal ranks obtained in the War.
18 I advocated this thesis in my paper “A view from Croatia. Peace and Stability in the
Balkans and in Southeast Europe. Realities and Contradictions,” Wilton Park
Conference: Peace and Stability in the Balkans and in Southeast Europe,  October
27-31, 1997.
19 See Tudjman, M. “Croatia as a Factor for Peace and Stability in Europe”, in. M.
Sopta (ed.) Croatia as a Stabilizing Factor for Peace in Europe, Croatian Center of
Strategic Studies, Zagreb, 1998.
20 So were both the former Czechoslovakia - the CSSR - and the USSR. The downfall
of these multi-national countries has a common point of departure: the need of the
so-called small nations to achieve their independence and sovereignty.
21 Cutileiro, Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans had advocated a provincial,
a cantonal partition model for BH, and/or envisioned BH as a union, consisting of
three republics.
22 See Admiral Davorin Domazet (2000). How aggression against Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina was prepared or the transformation of the JNA into Serbian
imperial force. National Security and the Future, 1(1)107-152.
23 25 September 1991. Upon Yugoslavia’s proposition, UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 713 on complete embargo on the import of arms in Yugoslavia. The
JNA’s attack on Vukovar had begun a month earlier, on August 25, 1991. A week
after the Resolution had been adopted, on October 1, 1991, the Montenegrin-
Serbian aggression aimed at the Dubrovnik region began along the entire border
between Montenegro and Croatia. On October 7, 1991, JNA airplanes bombed
president Tudjman’s office Banski dvori, during his meeting with Stipe Mesic and
Ante Markovic.
24 Badinter Commission, an arbitration commission of the Peace Conference for
Former Yugoslavia, decided on July 4, 1992 that the “SFRY does not exist any
more” and that the SRY could not be considered its “only successor.”
25 On December 11, 1991 the Security Council was presented with C. Vance’s plan
for the UN peace operation in former Yugoslavia. The Security Council approved
urgent deployment of 14000 blue helmets in Croatia on March 6, 1992.
26 Germany recognized Croatia on December 23, 1991, and EC countries did the


































27 At the referendum on Bosnia’s independence on February 29, 1992, 64.31 per-
cent of citizens, mostly Muslims and Croats, chose an independent and sovereign
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
28 Croatia recognized Bosnia on April 7, 1992.
29 The Split Agreement on Military Cooperation, i.e. “Declaration on the
Implementation of the Washington Agreement, joint defense from the Serbian
aggression and achievement of political solution”, was signed in Split by Croatian
president Franjo Tudjman, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic and
president of the Federation Kresimir Zubak on July 22, 1995.
30 Military operation “Storm” during which 26.5 percent of occupied Croatian territo-
ry was liberated, began on August 4 and ended on August 8, 1995.
31 The massacre in Srebrenica happened on July 7, 1995. and the fall of Zepa was
on July 25, 1995.
32 During peace negotiations in Dayton, representatives of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia initialed a General Peace Agreement on Bosnia-
Herzegovina on November 21, 1995.
33 Croats and Bosniacs signed the Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Special Relations with the Republic of Croatia in Washington on
March 18, 1994; in 1995 in Dayton all three peoples signed the agreement on
Bosnia-Herzegovina, comprised of the BH Federation and the Republika Srpska.
34 President Clinton’s directive: Executive order 13107, “Implementation of Human
Rights Treaties,” December 10, 1998
35 Sapere aude is the motto of the HIS, and is written into the agency’s emblem. The
sense of this Latin saying is ‘dare to be wise’ (Horatius), ‘have strength to use your
own reason’ (Kant); its literal meaning is ‘acquire wisdom through listening’, and its
essential meaning is ‘be smart’.
36 In October 1999 in Mostar (BH) SFOR conducted operation WESTAR. They pene-
trated into the National Security Service headquarters, aiming to prove HIS’s illegal
operations in the Federation. The HIS immediately issued a release requesting an
apology and a statement from the US Administration. I received letters from direc-
tors of the CIA and the NSA, supporting and confirming our statements. US
Ambassador in Zagreb William Montgomery on several occasions stated for the
media that Croatia had contributed significantly to the security of international
troops. SFOR never submitted any evidence of illegal actions of the HIS in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but the US government and the State Department failed to employ fair
treatment of SFOR and the Croatian government thereby preventing unnecessary
media manipulations.
37 Today HIS cooperates with twice as many foreign agencies than former Yugoslavia
did until 1990.
38 This is one of the few speeches that I wrote beforehand and therefore it is present-
ed here in its original form, and not from memory.
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